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LEAKE V. CAIN." ABOLITION OF THE PUBLIC DUTY RULE AND
THE STATUS OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN
COLORADO
INTRODUCTION
As a result of concerns about excessive jury awards, the unavailabil-
ity of liability insurance, and perceived increased litigiousness in Amen-
can society, a national debate has emerged regarding the restructuring
of tort liability.' Although this debate is in various stages in numerous
jurisdictions, issues of tort reform are already being addressed by state
courts and legislatures. Colorado is actively involved in trying to resolve
this debate and exemplifies the developing tort reform movement.
For example, Colorado has recently addressed the issue of tort re-
form in the area of governmental immunity. 2 In response to the "insur-
ance crisis" and judicial decisions that have increased the government's
exposure to liability, the Colorado legislature amended the Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act of 1972. 3 This recent legislation has en-
hanced the protection of government entities by broadening the scope
of sovereign immunity,4 and expressly protecting public officials by cod-
ifying official immunity. 5 Additionally, the common law public duty
1. See generally the preceding articles in this Symposium supra pp. 613-732.
2. The doctrine of governmental immunity, as discussed in section II, involves other
more narrowly-defined doctrines which are often confused with one another and used in-
terchangeably with "governmental immunity." These other doctrines, having both com-
mon law and statutory forms, are "sovereign immunity" (protects government entities
from tort liability, see, e.g., Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333
F.Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1971)), and "official immunity" (protects government officials from
tort liability, see, e.g., Watson v. Barker, 428 F.Supp. 590 (W.D. Pa. 1977)). Distinguishable
from these two doctrines are the "public duty rule" (protects both government officials
and entities from tort liability if, when acting, the official or entity owed a general duty to
the public rather than a special duty to the injured party, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 131 (5th ed. 1984)), and the "discretionary-nondiscretionary" test (protects both gov-
ernment officials and entities from liability if acting in a discretionary capacity), both of
which are employed in determining if liability exists under either an official or sovereign
immunity analysis.
The confusion of these interrelated but separate doctrines, and the general approach
to them with the broad brush of "governmental immunity," has blurred the entire area of
governmental immunity. One of the objectives of the author is to more clearly define the
various aspects of governmental immunity, thereby helping to refine courts' and practi-
tioners' analysis of governmental immunity or liability in Colorado.
3. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (Supp. 1986) (effective July 1, 1986),
amended COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (1982) (effective July 1, 1982) which
amended the original version of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act at COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 130-11-1 et. seq. (1972) (effective July 1, 1972) [hereinafter "Immunity Act"].
4. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, one form of governmental immunity, is lim-
ited in its definition to the protection of government entities from liability. For further
discussion on this doctrine, see infra note 13.
5. The doctrine of official immunity, another distinct form of governmental immu-
nity, is the protection of government officials from liability. For further discussion of this
doctrine, see infra note 14.
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rule 6 and the discretionary-nondiscretionary test were maintained under
the Immunity Act.
7
At the same time that this legislation was enacted, the Colorado
Supreme Court charted a different course in the area of governmental
immunity. In Leake v. Cain,8 the court abolished the public duty rule, 9
thereby eliminating one form of governmental immunity. This decision
is the most recent in a line of opinions which serves to limit the scope of
governmental immunity. Leake is of particular interest since the legisla-
ture sought to broaden statutory immunity at the same time that the
court acted to abolish one facet of governmental immunity. These op-
posing legislative and judicial approaches to governmental immunity
give rise to some uncertainty as to the future effectiveness of govern-
mental immunity under the newly-revised Immunity Act.
This article first will review governmental immunity and its various
forms prior to the Leake decision, including an examination of the histor-
ical struggle between the courts and the legislature regarding the proper
scope of governmental immunity. Next, the recent tort reform legisla-
tion relating to sovereign and official immunity will be examined. Fi-
nally, the significance of the Leake decision, in the context of the recent
statutory tort reform, will be discussed. The primary objectives in this
analysis are to provide the reader with a clearer understanding of the
law of governmental immunity and its development in Colorado, and to
suggest that the protections afforded by the Immunity Act should be
controlling in the future.' 0
6. The public duty rule is a form of governmental immunity that is designed to pro-
tect acting government officials and entities which owe a general duty to the public. If, on
the other hand, it is found that a special duty was owed to an injured party by the acting
official or entity, then the public duty rule offers no protection and liability attaches under
either an official or sovereign immunity analysis. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
7. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(2) (Supp. 1986) (common law immunity ex-
pressly incorporated). However, these two doctrines only existed in the context ofofficial
immunity under the Immunity Act. Since sovereign immunity at common law had been
abolished by the supreme court prior to the enactment of the Immunity Act, see infra notes
18-20, the incorporation clause in the Immunity Act could not include the common law
forms of sovereign immunity. See infra note 46.
8. 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).
9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.,
10. It is the author's position that the Immunity Act, as it now exists under COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (1982 & Supp. 1986), is a well-written statute that strikes an
appropriate balance between the legislative prerogative of protecting the government and
its various representatives from liability when performing government acts, and the desira-
bility of allowing an individual to recover for injury caused in certain situations. These
situations allow for recovery in a large number of areas, including where the government
entity or official performs in a willful or wanton manner. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106
(1982 & Supp. 1986). Specific situations in which governmental immunity does not apply
include: operation of a motor vehicle, operation of a public hospital or correction facility,
a dangerous road condition interfering with the movement of traffic, and a dangerous
condition of any public building or facility, or public water, gas, sanitation, electrical,
power or swimming facility. See also COLO. REV. STAT § 24-10-118(l)(c) (Supp. 1986) (lia-
bility attaches for willful and wanton conduct). More importantly, the legislature has ex-
pressly stated the necessity for immunity from tort actions because of the ultimate fiscal
burden the taxpayers would otherwise be required to bear if there were unlimited liability.




A. The Past Judicial Challenges to Governmental Immunity
The doctrine of governmental immunity, first adopted by American
jurists in the early national period,' I insulates governmental officials
and entities from liability.1 2 The protection of governmental immunity
has traditionally included both sovereign immunity' 3 and official immu-
nity. 14 The governmental immunity doctrine was incorporated into the
common law of Colorado in 189315 and enjoyed judicial favor until
1971.16 In that year, the Colorado Supreme Court initiated an assault
upon the doctrine that continued up to and through the Leake decision.
1. Common Law Sovereign Immunity's Demise and Qualified
Statutory Reinstatement - Origins of the Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act
Colorado's judicial assault upon governmental immunity was lev-
eled specifically upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity. At common
law, sovereign immunity protected government entities from tort liabil-
ity. 17 In three cases heard during 1971, the Colorado Supreme Court
abolished sovereign immunity at the county,' 8 school district' 9 and
underlying the codification of governmental immunity, see infra note 27. This public pol-
icy, articulated by the legislature and reaffirmed in the recent tort reform, is clear legisla-
tive intent which must be given full recognition by the courts.
11. Osborn v. Bank of The United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The early
national period, 1789-1826, was characterized by a dynamic legal system that served to
solidify American society in such a way that separated it from its revolutionary beginnings.
See S. PRESSER &J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY chs. 2,3. (1980). Adoption of
the doctrine of governmental immunity in 1824 is a good example of this stabilization
movement.
12. See generally, Comment, An Analysis of South Dakota's Sovereign Immunity Law: Govern-
mental v. Official Immunity, 28 S.D.L. REV. 317 (1983); see also Borchard, Governmental Liability
in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924).
13. The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes the assertion of a cause of action
against a governmental entity unless the sovereign consents or waives immunity. Principe
Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1971). Colo-
rado courts have generally referred to this doctrine as "governmental" immunity. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Abeyta v. City of
Denver, 165 Colo. 58, 437 P.2d 67 (1968); see also COLO. REV. STAT § 24-10-103(5) (1982)
(definition of a public entity). For a comprehensive examination of sovereign immunity,
see Note, Chasse v. Banas: The Eroding Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 21 N.H.B.J. 324 (1980);
see also Comment, Sovereign Immunity and the South Dakota Plaintiff: A Practical Approach, 26
S.D.L. REV. 300 (1981).
14. Under the doctrine of official immunity, governmental officials who act within the
scope of their authority, and who have taken an action requiring discretion, are insulated
from civil liability. Watson v. Barker, 428 F. Supp. 590, 592 (W.D. Pa. 1977). See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-10-103(4) (Supp. 1986) which defines a public employee.
15. Board of County Comm'rs v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, 33 P. 184 (1893) (immunity at
the county level); see also In re Senate Bill No. 83, 21 Colo. 69, 39 P. 1088 (1895) (immunity
at the state level).
16. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text for decisions in which the court abro-
gated sovereign immunity.
17. See supra notes 2 and 12.
18. Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971).
19. Flournoy v. School Dist. No. 1, 174 Colo. 110, 482 P.2d 966 (1971).
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state20 levels. In doing this, the Colorado courts adopted the position
taken by a growing number of states 2 ' and commentators, 2 2 severely
criticizing sovereign immunity as an inequitable doctrine that had never
been a legitimate part of common law.
23
The Colorado legislature responded to this judicial assault 2 4 by
codifying sovereign immunity in the Immunity Act.2 5 In rejecting the
analysis underlying the supreme court's decisions - that sovereign im-
munity had no rational foundation at its inception 26 - the legislature
justified sovereign immunity on the basis that it protected against exces-
sive governmental liability and that it fettered the execution of the gov-
erning process. 2 7  This codification of sovereign immunity was,
20. Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113, 482 P.2d 965 (1971).
21. Numerous jurisdictions rejected sovereign immunity prior to the decision in Ev-
ans. See, e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Parish
v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 Idaho
795, 473 P.2d 973 (1970); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959); Perkins v. State, 252 Ind. 549, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969); Carroll v. Kittle,
203 Kan. 841,457 P.2d 21 (1969); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964);
Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190 (1965); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962);Johnson v. Municipal Univ. of
Omaha, 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969); Walsh v. Clark County School Dist., 82
Nev. 414, 419 P.2d 774 (1966); Willis v. Department of Conservation and Economic Dev.,
55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d
618 (1962). Each of these states has since reinstated sovereign immunity in some statutory
form.
22. See e.g., Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383 (1970); Engdahl,
Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers. Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
23. These commentators contend that sovereign immunity, as expressed in the vener-
able maxim "the King can do no wrong," was originally intended to mean that the sover-
eign was not permitted to act wrongfully toward an individual, rather than the meaning
given in American law that the sovereign is not able to act wrongfully. Hall, Sovereign Immu-
nity and Re-emergence of the Governmental/Proprietary Distinction: A Setback in Idaho's Governmen-
tal Liability Law, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 197, at part II (1984); see also 1 F. PoLLOcK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 239 (2d ed.
1898); Borchard, supra note 12, at 4-9.
24. The court in Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968
(1971), recognized the legislature's ability to statutorily reinstate sovereign immunity and
so made its decision prospective in effect.
25. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (1982 & Supp. 1986). For an excellent
article examining the Immunity Act as a reaction to the supreme court's decisions aban-
doning sovereign immunity, see Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. A Judi-
cial Challenge and Legislative Response, 43 U. CoLo. L. REV. 449 (1972). For similar articles
examining judicial and legislative attitudes toward governmental immunity in other states,
see Hall, Sovereign Immunity and Re-emergence of the Governmental/Proprietary Distinction: A Set-
back in Idaho's Governmental Liability Law, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 197 (1984); Comment, Defining
Governmental Function Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 9J. CONTEMP. L. 193 (1983);
Comment, Governmental Liability-Strict Liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act 3 NEW.
ENG. REV. 609 (1981); Comment, Torts-Governmental Immunity under the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act, 11 N.M.L. REV. 475 (1981); Comment, Governmental Liability: A Review ofJudi-
cial Decisions Applying the Kansas Tort Claims Act, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 499 (1985); Comment,
Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability in Michigan: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Doctrine
and Related Statutory and Judicial Exceptions, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1761 (1982).
26. Evans, 174 Colo. at 102, 482 P.2d at 970.
27. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-102 (Supp. 1986) provides:
Declaration of Policy. It is recognized by the general assembly that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, whereunder the state and its political subdivisions are
often immune from suit for injury suffered by private persons, is, in some in-
[Vol. 64:4
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however, qualified. Sovereign immunity was not reinstated in all circum-
stances. 28 Although not subject to a direct tort action when a public
employee 29 inflicted injury, public entities3 0 are required by the Immu-
nity Act to indemnify the employee. 3 1 Except in the circumstances pro-
vided by statute, public entities once again enjoyed absolute immunity
from direct tort actions.
2. Subsequent Erosion of Statutory Sovereign Immunity
Judicial challenges to governmental immunity continued despite
sovereign immunity having taken statutory form. Specifically, sovereign
immunity remained vulnerable to judicial construction of the Immunity
stances, an inequitable doctrine. The general assembly also recognizes that the
supreme court has abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity effective July 1,
1972, and that thereafter the doctrine shall be recognized only to such extent as
may be provided by statute. The general assembly also recognizes that the state
and its political subdivisions provide essential public services and functions and
that unlimited liability could disrupt or make prohibitively expensive the provi-
sion of such essential public services and functions. The general assembly further
recognizes that the taxpayers would ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlim-
ited liability and that limitations on the liability of public entities and public em-
ployees are necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal
burdens. It is also recognized that public employees, whether elected or ap-
pointed, should be provided with protection from unlimited liability so that such
public employees are not discouraged from providing the services or functions
required by the citizens or from exercising the powers authorized or required by
law. It is further recognized that the state, its political subdivisions, and the pub-
lic employees of such public entities, by virtue of the services and functions pro-
vided, the powers exercised, and the consequences of unlimited liability to the
governmental process, should be liable for their actions and those of their agents
only to such an extent and subject to such conditions as are provided by this
article. The general assembly also recognizes the desirability of including within
one article all the circumstances under which the state, any of its political subdivi-
sions, or the public employees of such public entities may be liable in actions
which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of
action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and that the distinction for liabil-
ity purposes between governmental and proprietary functions should be
abolished.
28. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (l)(a)-(f) (1982 & Supp. 1986) provides the specific
instances in which sovereign immunity does not apply. They are as follows: 1) operation
of a motor vehicle; 2) operation of a hospital or correctional facility; 3) operation of a
public water, gas, sanitation, electrical or swimming facility; 4) a dangerous condition of
any road which interferes with the movement of traffic; and 5) a dangerous condition of
any public facility.
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 240-10-103 (Supp. 1986) defines a public employee as "an
officer, employee, servant, or authorized volunteer of the public entity, whether or not
compensated, elected, or appointed, but does not include an independent contractor or
any person who is sentenced to participate in any type of useful public service."
30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-103(5) (1982) defines a public entity as the "state,
county, city and county, incorporated city or town, school district, special improvement
district, and every other kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision of
the state organized pursuant to law."
31. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-110(l)(a), (b)(i)-(II) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (public
entity required to pay defense costs, judgments, and settlements entered against an official
acting within the scope of employment); see also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 29-5-111 (1982) (pub-
lic entity must indemnify a police officer found negligent when acting within the scope of
employment); Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo.392, 393, 532 P.2d 346, 347
(1975) (Immunity Act makes governmental entities indemnitors of their peace officers who
incur liability while employed).
1988]
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Act as exemplified in Stephen v. City and County of Denver3 2 and Wheeler v.
County of Eagle.3 3  In these decisions the Colorado Supreme Court
broadened the meaning of "dangerous road conditions," a statutory ex-
ception to sovereign immunity, 34 to include liability for damages that
resulted from negligent maintenance of a stop sign at intersecting
streets,3 5 and for injuries arising from the absence of a sidewalk along a
rural county road.3 6 Other decisions effectively eroded statutory sover-
eign immunity by narrowly construing the notice requirement of the Im-
munity Act,3 7 creating "assumed" duties3 8 owed by public entities in
addition to those under the Immunity Act,39 and determining that gov-
ernmental entities did not vicariously enjoy the common law immunity
afforded its officials.
4 0
3. Common Law Official Immunity Remains Subject
to Judicial Challenge
From its inception in 1971 until 1985, 4 1 the Immunity Act did not
32. 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983).
33. 666 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1983).
34. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-103(1) to 106(l)(d) (Supp. 1986).
35. Stephen, 659 P.2d at 668.
36. Wheeler, 666 P.2d at 561.
37. In State of Colorado v. Young, 665 P.2d 108, 110-11 (Colo. 1983), the court held
that the 90-day notice requirement period under COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-109(1) (1982)
(amended 1986 to require a 180-day notice) did not begin to run until the injured party
had a reasonable opportunity to discover the facts giving rise to a claim. See also Nowakow-
ski v. District Court, 664 P.2d 709, 711 (Colo. 1983) (notice requirement is an affirmative
defense and not jurisdictional and, therefore, subject to waiver); Ebke v. Julesberg School
Dist., 37 Colo. App. 349, 550 P.2d 355 (1976), aft'd, 193 Colo. 40, 562 P.2d 419 (1977)
(notice not required if action brought under contract rather than tort).
38. Moreland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 725 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1985) (by adopt-
ing building code, public entity assumed a duty to enforce it); Gilbert v. City of Arvada,
694 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1984), af'd in part, revd in part, Jefferson County School Dist. v.
Gilbert, 725 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1986) (by providing school crossing guards at one time of day
a public entity is deemed to have assumed a duty to provide crossing guards at other times
of the day); Justus v. Jefferson County School Dist., 683 P.2d 805 (Colo. App. 1984), aff d
in part, rev'd in part, 725 P.2d 767 (Colo. 1986) (public entity, by promulgating school
handbook containing policy on bicycle riding by students, deemed to have assumed a duty
to enforce that policy).
39. For the situations in which sovereign immunity is inapplicable and a duty is statu-
torily owed by public entities, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(l)(a)-(f) (1982 & Supp.
1986).
40. Mason v. State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo. App. 1984) ("[I]f every sovereign entity were to
be automatically immune from suit by virtue of vicarious enjoyment of the doctrine of
official immunity, the abrogation of sovereign immunity by our General Assembly and our
Supreme Court would be rendered meaningless."), revd in part, 724 P.2d 1289 (Colo.
1986) (court held that the public entity in the case was not liable, but on grounds of the
discretionary-nondiscretionary form of immunity; the court did not address the issue of
whether public entities vicariously enjoyed the immunity of their officials). The court also
held that sovereign immunity was waived under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-104(1) (1982)
where liability insurance was purchased, irrespective of express immunity under COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(2) (1982) (sovereign immunity not waived where injury incurred
from act by public official immune at common law).
41. For the original version of the Immunity Act, see 1971 CoLo. SEss. LAws 1204-18.
The Fifty-fifth General Assembly codified official immunity in a special session in 1985. See
infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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insulate individual public officials from tort liability. 4 2 In leaving public
officials subject to liability, the legislature also left public entities indi-
rectly vulnerable. 4 3 Nonetheless, the legislature recognized that official
immunity under common law would continue to protect public officials
from individual liability4 4 despite the fact that the Immunity Act did not
codify official immunity.
4 5
Official immunity at common law in Colorado, like sovereign immu-
nity, 4 6 was qualified, however, and took one of two forms. 4 7 First, under
the "discretionary-nondiscretionary" form, a public official was immune
from liability when acting in a discretionary capacity 48 within the scope
of employment when his conduct was not willful, malicious or intended
to cause harm.4 9 Second, official immunity existed under the "public
duty rule."' 50 Under this rule, a distinction was made between special
and general duties whereby an injured individual had no redress against
a public official owing a general duty to the public at large and not a
special duty to the specific injured party. 5 1 Since these two forms of
official immunity were derived from common law, they were subject to
the same persistent judicial challenge experienced by common law sov-
42. In Kristensen v. Jones, the court properly observed that:
[T]he Immunity Act is a legislative response to this court's abolition of the com-
mon law sovereign immunity doctrine, and was intended to define the bounds of
public entity liability in light of our decision. Since the common law doctrine did
not effect an individual employee's liability, it was not necessary that either this
court's abrogation of that doctrine or the General Assembly's enactment of the
Immunity Act deal with that liability, and neither our opinion nor the statute did
SO.
195 Colo. 125, 575 P.2d 854, 856 (1978) (citing Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187
Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975)).
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
44. For recent cases in which qualified immunity did protect such officials, see
Strothman v. Gefreh, 603 F. Supp. 256 (D. Colo. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.
1987) (administrative law judges immune in removal of the plaintiff, another administra-
tive law judge, from his position); Alias Smith &Jones, Inc. v. Barnes, 695 P.2d 302 (Colo.
App. 1984) (Commissioner of Insurance immune in renewing interinsurance exchange's
certificate of authority).
45. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(2) (1982 and Supp. 1986).
46. For the sake of clarification, it should be noted here that, although the public duty
rule was a doctrine of governmental immunity subsumed under the broader doctrines of
both sovereign and official immunity, after the abolition of common law sovereign immu-
nity, the public duty rule only existed as a part of official immunity. For this reason, the
Leake decision itself was a challenge to common law and statutory official immunity, the
only forms of governmental immunity in which the public duty rule was still viable at the
time of Leake.
47. A third form, known as the "governmental-proprietary distinction," was expressly
abrogated by the legislature. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § section 24-10-102 (Supp. 1986).
48. See Alias Smith &Jones, 695 P.2d at 306 ("Discretionary acts are those which are of
ajudgmerntal, planning or policy nature; nondiscretionary acts are those that involve per-
formance of a mandatory duty at the operational level.")
49. Compare Trimble v. City and County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1985) (man-
ager of city hospital exercised discretion when firing physician) with Winters v. City of
Commerce City, 648 P.2d 175 (Colo. App. 1982) (city not acting in discretionary capacity
in denying building permit).
50. The public duty rule is fully examined in the textual discussion at Section I, B.
51. See generally W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984); Note, Municipal Tort
Liability and the Public Duty Rule. A Matter of Statutory Analysis, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 391
(1980).
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ereign immunity. This challenge was punctuated by the Leake court's
decision abolishing one form of the official immunity doctrine-the pub-
lic duty rule.
B. The Public Duty Rule - Focus of the Leake Challenge to Immunity
The public duty rule had its inception at common law in 1855,52
and has thereafter been used to determine the liability of both public
entities and officials. 5 3 The majority of courts54 that have considered
the scope and application of the public duty rule have accepted it on the
grounds that it provides government entities with the necessary protec-
tion from liability to function efficiently. 5 5 In recent years, however, the
public duty rule has been denounced by commentators 56 and jurists5 7 as
being inequitable. These critics contend that by owing a general duty to
the public at large, public entities and officials, in fact, owe no duty at all.
Some of the jurisdictions5 8 which reject the public duty rule agree with
this criticism. 59 Others, however, reject the legal doctrine on the
52. South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855). See, e.g., T. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 385 (4th ed. 1932); F. MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, 590 (1924).
53. For modem cases applying the public duty rule, see Shore v. Town of Stonington,
187 Conn. 174, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982) and authority cited therein.
54. See Shore, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379; Warren v. District of Columbia, 444
A.2d I (D.C. App. 1981); Namauu v. Honolulu, 662 Hawaii 358, 614 P.2d 943 (1980);
Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc., 137 Il. App. 3d 611, 484 N.E.2d 909 (1985); City of Ham-
mond v. Cataldi, 449 N.E.2d 1184 (Ind. App. 1983); Hendrix v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan.
113,643 P.2d 129 (1982); Hempel v. Livingston-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 641 S.W.2d
51 (Ky. App. 1982); Foshee v. City of Detroit, 80 Mich. App. 263, 263 N.W.2d 337 (1977);
Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 1981); Cox v. Department of Natural Resources,
699 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. App. 1985); Frye v. Clark County, 87 Nev. 632, 637 P.2d 1215
(1981); O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485
(1983); Shelton v. Industrial Comm'n, 51 Ohio App. 2d 125, 367 N.E.2d 51 (1976);
Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 466 A.2d 1060 (1983); Barratt v.
Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219 (1985); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d
275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983); see also Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental
Unit from Tort Liability on Theory that Only General, Not Particular, Duty was Owed Under Circum-
stances, 38 A.L.R. 4TH 1194 (1985).
55. See, e.g., J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983);
accord Miller v. Ouray Electric Light & Power Co., 18 Colo. App. 131, 70 P. 447 (1902).
56. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAtV OF THE SEVENTIES § 25.07 (1976); Note,
State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 303 (1977).
57. See, e.g., Adams v. State of Alaska, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Stewart v.
Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980); Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283, 288 (Minn. 1981)
(Scott, J., dissenting).
58. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656
P.2d 597 (1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.
1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W. 2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d
1351 (La. 1980); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984);
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee,
74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).
59. See, e.g., Adams, 555 P.2d at 241-42. The court called the public duty rule the
"duty to all, duty to no-one doctrine" and held that:
[A]n application of the public duty doctrine here would result in finding no duty
owed the plaintiffs or their decedents by the state, although they were foreseeable
victims and a private defendant would have owed such a duty.... Why should
the establishment of duty become more difficult when the state is the defend-
ant... ? To allow the public duty doctine to disturb the equality would create
immunity when the legislature has not.
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grounds that it creates confusion in the law.60
The public duty rule was first adopted by Colorado in 1902 in Miller
v. Ouray Electric Light and Power Co.6 1 In that case, the court justified its
acceptance of the public duty rule after considering the government's
need to carry out its duties without the fear of impending liability.
6 2
The doctrine was later upheld in People v. Hoag63 and Richardson v.
Belknap.
6 4
The public duty rule enjoyed unqualified acceptance in Colorado
until 1972 when the supreme court, in Quintano v. Industrial Commission,
6 5
was confronted with a statutory duty arguably owed to the plaintiff by a
public entity and its officer. 6 6 Instead of employing the public duty rule
in its analysis, the court expressly avoided it. In denying recovery, the
court held only that the legislature must explicitly provide for a private
action to impose tort liability. 6 7 This decision arguably left the public
duty rule with an uncertain status. That uncertainty was evidenced by
two decisions after Quintano which challenged the viability of the public
duty rule. 6 8
C. Recent Tort Reform - The Legislature Responds
In 1986, at the same time in which the viability of the public duty
rule was adjudicated in Leake, the Colorado legislature enacted tort re-
form legislation in the area of governmental immunity. 6 9 This legisla-
tion was in response to the court's prior decisions which had increased
the liability exposure of government and its officials.
1. Official Immunity Codified while Leake was Adjudicated
Even after the Immunity Act was passed, public officials continued
60. See, e.g., Ryan, 656 P.2d at 599 ("We will no longer engage in the speculative exer-
cise of determining whether the tort-feasor has a general duty to the injured party, which
spells no recover, or if he had a specific individual duty which means recovery.").
61. 18 Colo. App. 137, 70 P. 447 (Colo. 1902) (county commissioners owed general
duty to inspect the county jail wiring system and therefore no recovery was allowed for the
death of an inmate who suffocated during fire at the jail).
62. Id. at 139, 70 P. at 449 ("for no sane man would assume the position [of count%
commissioner] with such potential liability attached").
63. 54 Colo. 542, 131 P. 400 (Colo. 1913) (county clerk owed general duty to make a
newspaper publication as required by law, hence, no recovery allowed).
64. 73 Colo. 52, 213 P. 335 (Colo. 1923) (county commissioner owes general duty to
maintain public highways; no individual right of action can exist).
65. 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972).
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 80-2-1 (1963) required the Industrial Commission to inspect
factories and workshops "for the purpose of protecting said employees or guests against
damages arising from imperfect or dangerous machinery."
67. Quintano, 178 Colo. at 135-36, 495 P.2d at 1139.
68. Compare Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 38 Colo. App. 44, 47, 554
P.2d 317, 320 (1976) (following public duty rule) with Martinez v. City of Lakewood, 655
P.2d 1388 (Colo. App. 1982) (finding public duty rule a function of sovereign immunity
and therefore insupportable where the Immunity Act abrogated sovereign immunity).
69. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (Supp. 1986) (effective July 1, 1986)
amended COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (1982) (effective July 1. 1982) which
amended CoLo. REV. STAT. § § 130-11 -1 et. seq. (1972) (effective July 1, 1972) (original
version of Immunity Act).
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to be exposed to liability for their actions despite the availability of qual-
ified immunity at common law. 70 It also became increasingly difficult
for the government to obtain liability insurance. Consequently, both the
governor and the legislature recognized that the continued tort expo-
sure of public officials required immediate attention. 7 ' In 1985, the
General Assembly convened in a special session to amend the Immunity
Act. 7 2 That special session produced legislation which conferred the
same immunities and limitations on liability of public officials as existed
for public entities under the original Immunity Act.
73
2. Sovereign Immunity Reaffirmed
The Colorado General Assembly recently enacted comprehensive
tort reform legislation which also included amendments to the Immu-
nity Act.7 4 These recent amendments came in response to the height-
ened "insurance crisis" in Colorado 7 5 which prompted the governor to
form a special task force. One purpose of the task force was to investi-
gate the reasons for the unavailability of insurance. 76 Furthermore, this
tort reform was enacted to address those judicial decisions that weak-
ened the effectiveness of statutory immunity and exacerbated the insur-
ance crisis. For example, the legislation now clearly states that a
dangerous road condition is one that interferes physically with the move-
ment of traffic, 7 7 that the adoption of a policy or regulation does not
70. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977) (physician's treatment
during plaintiff's pregnancy not protected under Colorado law by governmental immu-
nity); Cooper v. Hollis, 42 Colo. App. 505, 600 P.2d 109 (1979) (officer's impoundment of
vehicle not automatically protected by official immunity).
71. Whereas, the difficulties encountered by public entities at all levels of govern-
ment in obtaining insurance, combined with the ambiguous applicability of pro-
tections of the Governmental Immunity Act to officers and employees of public
entities, has heightened the concern of public officers and employees regarding
their personal liability for acts or omissions committed within the scope of their
employment.
1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 1 (Supp. 1985).
72. 55th Gen. Assembly, 1st Extraordinary Sess. (1985).
73. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(2) (Supp. 1986) provides:
A public employee shall be immune from liability in any claim for injury, whether
brought pursuant to this article, section 29-5-111, C.R.S., the common law, or
otherwise, which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be
the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and which arises out
of an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his
duties and within the scope of his employment unless the act or omission causing
such injury was willful and wanton; except that no such immunity may be asserted
in an action for injuries resulting from the circumstances specified in section 24-
10-106(1).
74. H.R. 1196, 55th Gen. Assembly, 1st Extraordinary Sess. (1985) (effective July 1,
1986) and appearing in COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-101 et. seq. (Supp. 1986).
75. Newspaper articles chronicled the plight of local governments throughout the
state experiencing cancellation or nonrenewal of policies. See, e.g., Sanko, Skyrocketing Costs
Trigger Anger, Alarm, Rocky Mtn. News, Nov. 19, 1985, at BI, col.1.
76. The Colorado Special Task Force on Tort Liability and Insurance included its
recommendations in THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON TORT LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, Liability
Insurance and the Law of Torts in Colorado (1986).




create an assumed duty of care owed by the government, 78 and that gov-
ernmental entities do, in fact, vicariously enjoy the common law immu-
nities of their public officials.
7 9
II. LEAKE V CAIN - OFFICIAL IMMUNITY CHALLENGED
A. Facts
On the evening of September 9, 1978, Ralph Crowe, age eighteen,
attended a party in Commerce City where he consumed enough alcohol
to become intoxicated under Colorado law. 80 Later that evening, when
five Commerce City police officers arrived to disperse the party, Crowe
became disruptive and was detained for a short time by the officers.
Crowe's younger brother, Eddie, age seventeen, offered to drive Ralph
home. Satisfied that Eddie carried a valid driver's license and appeared
to be sober, the police officers released Ralph to his younger brother
and the two youths left the party in a vehicle driven by Eddie. 8' Eddie
then drove to a convenience store where Ralph assumed the driving.
Crowe drove to a new location where the party was to resume. Upon his
arrival, he struck six persons on the street, killing Jeff Cain and Jay
Chase.
8 2
The victims' families filed a wrongful death action, naming as de-
fendants Crowe and his father, the five individual police officers, and the
City of Commerce City.8 3 The trial court, employing the public duty
rule in its analysis, granted summary judgment on the grounds that the
doctrine of official immunity insulated the officers from liability because
they owed no special duty to the decedents.8 4 The court of appeals re-
versed and based its decision on the discretionary-nondiscretionary test
for official immunity. In holding that the officers were not immune from
liability, the court of appeals found that the officers were not performing
a discretionary act when they decided to release Crowe to his brother. 85
78. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.5(l) (Supp. 1986). See supra notes 38-39 and ac-
companying text.
79. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(3) (Supp. 1986). See supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text. For other areas where tort reform addressed decisions which eviscerated the
Immunity Act, see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-109(1) (Supp. 1986) (notice period begins to
run after the discovery of the injury) in response to decisions such as State of Colorado v.
Young, 665 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1983) and Nowakowski v. District Court, 664 P.2d 709 (Colo.
1983); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-104 (Supp. 1986) (repealed provision of CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 24-10-104 (1982) which provided that sovereign immunity was waived whenever
the government purchased liability insurance) in response to the holding in Mason v.
State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo. App. 1984).
80. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 153-54 (Colo. 1986). CoLo. REV. STAT. § 42-4-
1202(2)(c) (1984) provides the criteria whereby an individual is considered intoxicated.
81. Leake, 720 P.2d at 153-54.
82. Id. at 154.
83. Although as a public entity, Commerce City was itself immune from a direct action
under the Immunity Act, it could be named as a party since it was statutorily obligated to
indemnify the police officers pursuant to § 240-10-11 0(l)(a). Additionally, Commerce
City was liable for the defense and any judgment entered against the employees as police
officers under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 29-5-111(1) (1977).
84. Leake, 720 P.2d at 154.
85. Cain v. Leake, 695 P.2d 798, 800-01 (Colo. App. 1984) (the "decision by a police
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B. Holding
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the police officers' argument
that they owed no duty to Jeff Cain and Jay Chase. In arriving at its
decision, the court concurred with the trial court's conclusion but re-
jected the public duty rule on which the trial court had based its deci-
sion. 86 Instead, the court employed the same test as the court of
appeals, the discretionary-nondiscretionary test. Unlike the court of ap-
peals analysis, however, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed after
finding that decisions made by police officers regarding custody and de-
tention are discretionary.
87
1. Abolition of the Public Duty Rule
Sensitive to the uncertain status of the public duty rule created by
its decision in Quintano, the first issue addressed by the supreme court in
Leake was whether the public duty rule was a viable doctrine of law in
Colorado. 88 The court concluded that it was not and, accordingly, the
rule was abolished.89
Despite its acceptance by a majority ofjurisdictions, the public duty
rule was abandoned in Leake for several reasons. First, the court pointed
out that there were "significant exceptions" to the public duty rule, even
in jurisdictions that follow the doctrine, which dilute the potency of the
rule as an effective legal doctrine. 90 Second, the court observed that the
public duty rule was widely criticized for confusing tort law by creating
the artificial distinctions of public and private duties, 9 1 and for being
inequitable. 9 2 Third, the court was not persuaded by arguments that
officer to release a disputatious, intoxicated person from custody, and to send that person
onto the roadway under the ostensible supervision of a younger brother as caretaker" is
not a discretionary act), rev'd, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (officers not liable under a con-
ventional tort analysis).
86. Leake, 720 P.2d at 155.
87. d. at 164.
88. In a concurring opinion, Justice Rovira argued that it was unnecessary for the
court to address the viability of the public duty rule since the officers escaped liability
using conventional tort principles, and because neither the court of appeals nor the par-
ties' briefs addressed the public duty rule. See Leake, 720 P.2d at 164-65. (Rovira, J., spe-
cially concurring). The majority defended its examination of the public duty rule on the
ground that judicial economy necessitated a resolution. Id. at 157-58, note 7.
89. Id. at 158-59.
90. Id. at 159. One of the "significant exceptions" articulated by the court is the "spe-
cial relationship" exception, under which the public duty rule fails to insulate a public
official or entity when a special relationship existed with the injured party at the time the
injury occurred. See, e.g., Campbell v. Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975) (spe-
cial relationship existed between electrical inspector and plaintiff). Another exception
cited by the court - the "statutory" exception - exposes a public official or entity to
liability if a statutory duty owed to the plaintiff is breached. See, e.g., Irwin v. Town of
Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984) (police officer owed and breached statutory
duty to arrest intoxicated driver).
91. Leake, 720 P.2d at 159-60.
92. Id. Authorities cited by the court which criticized the public duty rule included
both judges and commentators. See, e.g., Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100
Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451, 460 (1983) (Utter,J., concurring); Note, State Tort Liability for
Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 303 (1977).
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the rule prevents excessive governmental liability or that abolition of the
rule will interfere with governmental operations. 93 Instead, the court
maintained that an injured party would still have to satisfy the require-
ments of foreseeability and proximate cause required by a traditional
tort analysis.9 4 This burden of proof would allow officials to enjoy qual-
ified immunity under the discretionary-nondiscretionary test.9 5 Accord-
ing to the court, therefore, the government's exposure would still be
limited and officials could continue to effectively perform their duties
without fear of imminent liability. 9 6 Finally, the court inferred that the
public duty rule was no longer supported by public policy. The court
observed that the tortfeasor's governmental status was the reason for
denying recovery under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which had
been abrogated by the court in 1971.97 The Colorado legislature did
nothing to revive absolute sovereign immunity and, in fact, Colorado
statutory provisions dealing with governmental immunity provided that
public entities were to be treated the same as private parties.98 There-
fore, the public duty rule, which also denied recovery because of a
tortfeasor's status, was in conflict with the legislative pronouncements
and the judicial abolition of sovereign immunity.9 9
2. Conventional Tort Analysis-Special Relationship and
Statutory Duty
The second issue addressed by the court was whether a special rela-
tionship existed between the officers and either Crowe or the decedents,
thereby creating a duty on the part of the officers to prevent injury by
Crowe. 10 0 The court relied on Jackson v. Clements 101 in its analysis. In
Jackson the court held that a special relationship existed between police
officers and an intoxicated tortfeasor if there was an ongoing custodial
relationship between the officers and the intoxicated person. 10 2 Fur-
93. Leake, 720 P.2d at 160.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 160 (citing Trimble v. City of Denver, 697 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1985) (dicussing
the discretionary-nondiscretionary form of immunity)).
96. Id.
97. Id. Sovereign immunity was abolished by the Colorado Supreme Court's decision
in Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971).
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-107 (Supp. 1986) provides: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this article, where sovereign immunity is not a bar under section 24-10-106, liabil-
ity of the public entity shall be determined in the same manner as if the public entity were
a private person."
99. Leake, 720 P.2d at 160.
100. Id. The court explicitly employed RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)
which provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless:
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the
other a right to protection.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (duty of those in charge of person having
dangerous propensities).
101. 146 Cal. App.3d 983, 194 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1983).
102. Jackson, 146 Cal. App.3d at 985, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
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thermore, a special relationship could be created where police officers
themselves either created the peril or induced detrimental reliance on
the part of the injured or deceased party.'
0 3
The court in Leake first reasoned that since the custodial relation-
ship between the officers and Crowe ceased when Crowe was released to
his brother at the party, the officers were at that time discharged of the
duty of protection. 10 4 Next, the court distinguished the circumstances
underlying Leake from those in Irwin v. Town of Ware, 10 5 on which the
plaintiff relied, and held that no special relationship existed between the
officers and the decedents.' 0 6 In Irwin the police officers created the
peril when they elected not to arrest a person known to be operating a
vehicle while intoxicated and who subsequently injured others. The
foreseeability of injury by an intoxicated driver created a special rela-
tionship with the plaintiffs in Irwin. The court held, however, that since
the officers in the Leake case did not encounter an intoxicated person
while he was operating a vehicle, the deaths of the decedents were too far
removed from the officers' decision to release Crowe.10 7 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that no duty existed under the "creation of peril" test
under the special relationship rule. 10 8
The final issue addressed by the court was whether a duty was owed
by the officers by virtue of the "emergency commitment" statute.' 0 9
The court recognized that in order for an actionable statutory duty to
exist it must be shown that the claimant was a member of the class of
persons that the statute was designated to protect, and that the injury
suffered was of the type that the statute was intended to prevent.' 10
The court held that the decedents' claim failed under the first part
of the statutory-duty analysis. Even though the statute arguably contem-
plated protection of the public against intoxicated persons, it did not
include persons injured by an intoxicated individual who had been re-
leased to a sober relative by police officers acting in a discretionary
capacity.'' 1
103. Id. at 986, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
104. Leake, 720 P.2d at 161.
105. 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E. 2d 1292 (1984).
106. Leake, 720 P.2d at 161-62.
107. Id.
108. Unlike the Jackson court, the Colorado Supreme Court did not address the issues
of the creation of a special relationship by an assumption of duty of care, or detrimental
reliance on a promise that the police would protect them. Id. at 161, n.10.
109. The emergency commitment statute, codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 25-1-310(1)
(1982), provides in pertinent part: "When any person is intoxicated or incapacitated by
alcohol and clearly dangerous to the health and safety of himself and others, such persons
shall be taken into protective custody by law enforcement authority .. .acting with prob-
able cause ... "
110. Leake, 720 P.2d at 162.
111. We recognize that a cursory reading of the emergency commitment statute
may suggest that the statute was intended to protect members of the public
against intoxicated persons who appear "clearly dangerous." However, in our
view, the General Assembly did not intend to create a claim for relief against
police officers who, in their discretion, release an intoxicated person into the





In addition to holding that the officers owed no duty under a con-
ventional tort analysis, the court concluded that the officers were im-
mune from liability under the discretionary-nondiscretionary distinction
of official immunity. 1 2 The court held that the court of appeals incor-
rectly relied on Irwin in deciding that the officers acted in a nondiscre-
tionary capacity.' 13 In Irwin the officers were required by statute to
arrest the intoxicated driver just as the officers in Leake would have been
had Crowe been operating a vehicle."l 4 In Leake, however, the officers
operated under the emergency commitment statute which required the
officers themselves to exercise discretion in determining whether an in-
dividual should be taken into custody.' 15 As a result, even though the
court followed the discretionary-nondiscretionary distinction employed
by the court of appeals, it reversed the appellate court for incorrectly
applying it. 116
III. ANALYSIS
A. Abandonment of the Public Duty Rule - Defective Underpinnings
The court in Leake, in fashioning its reasons for abandonment of the
public duty rule, revealed a hostile attitude toward, and misunderstand-
ing of, governmental immunity in Colorado.
1. Conventional Tort Analysis: A Thin Barrier to Liability
The Leake court offered a fragile argument in response to the con-
cerns of excessive liability and unhampered execution of official acts ex-
pressed by proponents of the public duty rule,1 17 as well as by the
legislature through its promulgation of the Immunity Act. 1 8 The court
conveniently simplified tort law by reasoning that the negligence princi-
ples of foreseeability and proximate cause serve to negate these con-
cerns. Since the time that Justice Cardozo issued his now-famous
opinion on foreseeability and proximate cause,1 1 9 courts, including
those in Colorado,' 20 have struggled with the proper scope of these
principles. 12 1 Both doctrines have been widely criticized for escaping
112. Even though the officials were absolved from liability under conventional tort
analysis, the court addressed the issue of official immunity "because the court of appeals
erroneously narrowed the scope of official immunity afforded police officers." Id. at 163.
113. Id.
114. Under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202 (1984) an officer must arrest a person driv-
ing while intoxicated.
115. Leahe, 720 P.2d at 164.
116. Id. at 163-64.
117. Id. at 160.
118. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-102 (Supp. 1986) for this legislative declaration.
119. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
120. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 51 at § 352.
121. For example, compare Burchinal v. Gregory, 41 Colo. App. 490, 586 P.2d 1012
(1978) (failure to supervise a guest on trampoline did not result in foreseeable injury) with
Hall v. Cheyenne Mtn. Museum and Zoological Soc'y., 492 P.2d 894 (Colo. App. 1972)
(walking in area where hay being pitched on windy day did result in foreseeable injury).
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definition. 12
2
By assuming that foreseeability and proximate cause sufficiently
guard against burdening the government and depleting its funds, the
court failed to recognize that the application of these principles often
provides little protection from liability. 123 Moreover, given the past re-
strictive application of governmental immunity by the Colorado
courts, 1 2 4 it is questionable whether either foreseeability or proximate
cause would effectively serve to limit the liability of public entities or
calm officials' fears of lawsuits.
In emphasizing the availability of these conventional prerequisites
to tort liability, the court glossed over the fact that its decision actually
lowers the threshold for official liability at common law by elimination of
the public duty rule. The thin liability barriers of foreseeability and
proximate cause serve as weak replacements for the public duty rule.
Consequently, the Leake decision increases the exposure of government
to tort liability under the Immunity Act due to the incorporation of com-
mon law immunity under the Act. 12 5 Although the court ultimately ab-
solved the officers in Leake of liability in a commendable tort analysis, 1
2 6
neither the ultimate result nor the discussion of the availability of con-
ventional tort principles minimizes the importance of Leake as a continu-
ation of the judicial limitation on governmental immunity.
2. Analysis of Common Law Immunity Misplaced
The court's reliance on the public duty rule as a functional
equivalent to common law sovereign immunity 12 7 is misplaced.
Although it is correct that the public duty rule is a function of sovereign
immunity, it is inapplicable in an analysis of official immunity. The public
duty rule was a form of both sovereign and official immunity at common
law. 128 In the sole context of sovereign immunity, however, the public
duty rule has no remaining viability in jurisdictions that have abandoned
sovereign immunity. On the other hand, where sovereign immunity has
been abolished, it does not follow that the public duty rule also lacks
viability under the scope of official immunity.
Sovereign and official immunity are distinct forms of governmental
122. See, e.g., Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1971);
Myers, Causation and Common Sense, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 238 (1951); Seavay, Cardozo and the Law of
Torts, 52 HARV. L.Q. 1127 (1939) (author pungently points out that proximate cause has
become "a stench in the nostrils of Law Review editors" due to its inconclusiveness).
123. See W. PROSSER, supra note 51, at § 41:
There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor,
despite the manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is
there yet any general agreement as to the best approach.
124. See supra textual discussion at Section I(A).
125. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(4) (Supp. 1986); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
10-106(2)-(3), 118(2) (Supp. 1986). Therefore, by removing the protection of the public
duty rule enjoyed by officials under common law, the decision weakens the Immunity Act.
126. See Leake, 720 P.2d at 160-63.
127. Id., at 159-60.
128. See supra Sections I(A, 3) and I(B) of this comment.
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immunity. 129 The court demonstrated its misunderstanding of this fun-
damental concept by relying on the abrogation of sovereign immunity
for the purpose of abolishing the public duty rule in the context of official
immunity. 13
0
B. Governmental Immunity Act Misconstrued
The supreme court revealed the most significant analytical defect in
its decision when it cited section 24-10-107131 of the Immunity Act in
support of the proposition that the public duty rule, the equivalent of
sovereign immunity, should be abandoned since sovereign immunity
had not been legislatively revived.' 32 The position taken by the court
was, therefore, that the Immunity Act effectively waived sovereign
immunity.
In taking this position the court cited section 24-10-107 out of con-
text. According to the court, this section "instructs courts to resolve the
plaintiff's claim without regard to the public status of the defendant."133
However, the court failed to recognize that this provision only applies
when sovereign immunity has been waived in the limited circumstances
enumerated in the Immunity Act.' 34 Except in those specific, enumer-
ated circumstances, sovereign immunity is a complete bar to recovery'
under the Immunity Act. By citing only section 24-10-107, however, the
court creates the impression that under the Immunity Act, immunity is
the exception and liability the rule. 13 5 This is a misconstruction of the
Immunity Act and ignores the designed purpose of governmental pro-
tection from tort liability for which the Immunity Act was enacted.' 36
C. Leake and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act
To an extent, the legislature has preempted the future application
of Leake since public officials are now statutorily insulated from liability,
irrespective of a common law liability analysis.' 3 7 However, where im-
munity has been waived, ' 3 8 and where common law principles of immu-
129. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
130. The supreme court is not alone in confusing the separate principles involved
under a governmental immunity analysis. Lower courts have also articulated this same
flawed analysis as the court in Leake. See, e.g., Martinez v. Lakewood, 655 P.2d 1388 (Colo.
App. 1982).
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-107 (Supp. 1986).
132. See supra Section III, A of this comment.
133. Leake, 720 P.2d at 160.
134. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-104, 106(1)(a)-(f) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The cir-
cumstances in which public entity and official immunity are waived are numerous. See
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (Supp. 1986).
135. At least one other Colorado court has taken this erroneous approach to the Im-
munity Act. See, e.g., Martinez v. City of Lakewood, 655 P.2d 1388 (Colo. App. 1982).
136. See supra Section 1, A, 1 of this comment. Curiously, the supreme court correctly
articulated the status of sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act in Kristensen v.
Jones, 195 Colo. 122, 124-25, 575 P.2d 854, 855-56 (1978).
137. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-10-118(2) (Supp. 1986).
138. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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nity remain to protect persons in government,' 3 9 the public duty rule no
longer offers protection to public officials acting within the course and
scope of their duties. 140 More importantly, Leake is significant because
the abolition of the public duty rule marks a further inroad into govern-
mental immunity in Colorado. which in turn suggests that the judicial
persistence in exposing the government to tort liability will continue de-
spite legislative action. This conclusion is supported by Colorado
courts' past decisions. 14 1 Therefore, even though the legislature has
now codified both sovereign and official immunity, the amended Immu-
nity Act may provide less governmental protection than that contem-
plated by the legislature since the courts have demonstrated a
willingness to take the lead in providing a remedy to a party injured by
public officials or entities. Consequently, further reform may be
required.
Future limitations on governmental immunity by judicial construc-
tion of the Immunity Act are undesirable and contrary to the express
legislative intent. Each time the supreme court has acted to erode gov-
ernmental immunity, the legislature has reacted by reinstating protec-
tion from tort liability. These persistent responses illustrate the
legislature's commitment to sovereign and official immunity. With the
recent reform, the representative branch of government has again made
it clear that public policy favors governmental immunity. This concept




In Leake, the Colorado Supreme Court drove another stake into the
heart of governmental immunity by abolishing the public duty rule and
increasing the exposure of government and its officials to tort liability.
Leake is the most recent decision on a continuum of cases that exempli-
fies courts' distaste for governmental immunity in both common law and
statutory forms. This judicial predisposition is contrary to the intent of
the legislature to insulate the government from tort liability. The 1986
amendments to the Immunity Act make it clear that the direction of tort
reform in Colorado regarding governmental immunity is toward limita-
tion of exposure to liability and not expansion. Any future interpreta-
tion of governmental immunity should recognize this express legislative
intent. In this way the will of the people, as expressed through the dem-
ocratic process, would not be thwarted.
Kevin M. Dufficy
139. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(2)-(3), 118(2)-(4) (Supp. 1986).
140. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(4) (Supp. 1986); see also COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-
10-106(2)-(3), 118(2) (Supp. 1986).
141. See, e.g., supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
142. See Comment, The Need for State Immunity from Suit, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1321
(1984) (discussing the desirability of the recognition of statutory immunity by courts).
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